Pretension Strategy in the Surviving Game


Presently, we cannot find the scientific analysis that clearly explains the deepest roots of global economical and moral crisis. Because of that many famous politicians, economists, sociologists denote the understanding of current situation as the most valuable attainment. Under traditional influence of the doctrine of spontaneous harmony of egoistic individual behavior many economists believe that competition and private property rights through the markets\ price mechanism leads in the long run to the Pareto efficiency equilibrium. At the same time the social and economic reality categorically asks to ascertain the market failure and to revision the classical statements of microeconomics. The perfect competition market has lost its attributes due to dialectics of interactions of agents. The investigation of the interactions strategies of the individuals are based on the game theory, what also helps to understand the role of asymmetric information as a specific market failure factor. In the present paper the Martin Shubik classical surviving game is analyzed and some statements of Herbert Gintis concerning this game are critically appraised. The solution of Martin Shubik game in the original geometrical form is offered. The problem of Martin Shubik \ does the fittest necessary survive?\ is transformed according the case of asymmetric information in problem \ does the pretender survive?\ , for which the answer \ if the agent is not the weakest, but he pretends to be the weakest, than this agent survives with high probability\ is offered. The results of the present paper appear to be innovative, not discussed in literature available to the author of the present paper.


game, probability of surviving, interactions of the agent’s strategies, Nash equilibrium, asymmetric information, pretension